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Abstract 
Whether the likelihood of credit booms ending is dependent on its age or not, or whether the 
respective behaviour is smooth or bumpy are important issues to which the economic 
literature has not given attention yet. This paper tries to fill that gap in the literature, 
exploring those issues with a proper duration analysis. Credit booms are identified 
considering two criteria well established in the literature: (i) the Mendoza-Terrones criteria; 
(ii) and the Gourinchas-Valdes-Landarretche criteria. A continuous-time Weibull duration 
model is employed over a group of 71 countries for the period 1975q1-2010q4 to investigate 
whether credit booms are duration dependent or not. Our findings show that the likelihood of 
credit booms ending increases over its duration and that these events have become longer 
over the last decades. Additionally, we extend the baseline Weibull duration model in order to 
allow for change-points in the duration dependence parameter. The empirical findings 
support the presence of a change-point: increasing positive duration dependence is observed 
in booms that last less than eight to ten quarters, but it becomes decreasing or even irrelevant 
for longer events. Analogous results are found for those credit boom episodes that are 
followed by systemic banking crisis (bad credit booms). Our findings also show that credit 
booms are, on average, longer in Industrial than in Developing countries. 
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1. Introduction 
The rapid build-up in domestic credit can have deleterious effects on economic 
activity. Understanding the dynamics of credit is important to evaluate not only the behaviour 
of the economic activity but also the financial system. The literature argues that recessions are 
more likely, the longer an economy builds up booms in financial markets —more specifically, 
booms in credit markets (Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2012). In addition, there is evidence 
that the probability of banking distress increases the longer the duration of credit booms are 
(Barajas, Dell’Ariccia and Levechenko, 2009). 
The empirical literature shows that credit expansions can lead to higher growth 
(Levine, 2005) but also heighten aggregate volatility and the likelihood of banking crisis 
(Reinhart and Kaminsky, 1999; Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002). Credit booms are 
typically the result of result of surges in private capital inflows (Bruno and Shin, 2012; 
Calderón and Kubota, 2012; Obstfeld, 2012). These surges lead to a rapid build-up of 
leverage which, in turn, may lead to financial fragility (Borio and Disyatat, 2011; Gourinchas 
and Obstfeld, 2012). A massive rising of inflows of foreign capital may lead to excessive 
monetary and credit expansions (Sidaoui et al., 2011), increase the vulnerability associated to 
currency and maturity mismatches (Akyuz, 2009), create distortions in asset prices (Agnello 
and Sousa, 2011; Agnello et al., 2012a) and, consequently, bubbles in stock and market prices 
and overvaluation of the real exchange rate (Magud et al., 2012). 
 Duration analysis has been widely used to examine the length of business cycle 
phases. Diebold and Rudebusch (1992) conduct a duration analysis to evaluate the 
stabilization process of the economic activity during the post war period. In the same line, 
Vilasuso (1995) employs nonparametric change-point tests to examine the duration of the 
business cycle in the United States. Castro (2010) also conducts a duration analysis over a 
panel of industrial countries and finds evidence that supports that the longer an expansion or 
contraction, the more likely it is for that phase of the cycle to come to an end. Claessens, Kose 
and Terrones (2011) apply the Weibull duration model to financial cycles and find that the 
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longer a financial downturn (as measured by the length of peak-to-trough phases in credit, 
housing prices and equity prices), the more likely this downturn is likely to end. 
Hence, understanding the duration of credit boom is of crucial importance given its 
consequences on the financial sector and economic activity. For instance, Barajas, 
Dell’Ariccia and Levchenko (2009) and Dell’Ariccia et al. (2012) examine whether the 
duration of credit booms is important in predicting future financial crisis or not. In fact, the 
literature finds that the duration (as well as the amplitude) of the credit booms is a robust 
predictor of those booms that end up in a systemic banking crisis. 
The main goals of this paper are: first, to investigate whether the likelihood of credit 
boom episodes ending depends on its own length of time, i.e. whether they are duration 
dependent or not; and, second, to analyse whether there are breaks in its behaviour employing 
a Weibull duration model with change-points. Castro (2012) adapts the Weibull model with 
change-points proposed by Lara-Porras et al. (2005) to examine the duration of the business 
cycle phases. Therefore, we follow his strategy in employing a continuous-time Weibull 
model with change-points to analyze the duration of credit booms. 
Our paper uses the quarterly gross capital flows data for 71 countries from 1975q1 and 
2010q4. Following Rothenberg and Warnock (2011), Forbes and Warnock (2011), and 
Calderón and Kubota (2012a, 2012b), we argue that the dynamics of capital flows and credit 
markets along the business cycles are better captured using quarterly data. 
The identification of credit boom episodes follows the work undertaken by Calderon 
and Kubota (2012b). Given that there is no single criterion to identify credit booms, they use: 
(i) the Mendoza and Terrones (2008) criteria (MT-criteria) and (ii) and the Gourinchas, 
Valdes and Landarretche (2001) criteria (GVL-criteria). The first criterion identifies a credit 
boom when the deviation of the real credit per capita from its trend exceeds 1.75 times its 
standard deviation, whilst the second one considers that a credit boom takes place if the 
deviation of the ratio of credit to GDP from its trend exceeds 1.5 times its standard deviation 
or the (year-on-year) growth in the credit-GDP ratio exceeds 20 percent. The paper also 
differentiates regular booms vis-a-vis those that end up in a systemic bank crisis or bad credit 
booms. Empirical evidence shows that not all credit booms end in a full-blown banking crisis 
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and that a large share of them are followed by a soft landing (Tornell and Westermann, 2002; 
Barajas et al. 2009; Calderón and Servén, 2011). Consequently, we define bad credit booms 
as credit booms followed by a systemic banking crisis (Barajas et al., 2009; Calderón and 
Kubota, 2011). 
We start by estimating a basic continuous-time Weibull model to investigate whether 
the likelihood of credit booms ending depends on its own age and concluded that, in fact, it 
does depend: credit booms are affected by positive duration dependence. We then extend the 
baseline Weibull duration model to allow for change-points in the duration dependence 
parameter —as implemented in Lara-Porras et al. (2005) and Castro (2012). The basic 
Weibull model assumes that the behaviour of duration dependence is smooth (i.e. either 
constant, increasing or decreasing) over time, whereas the degree of likelihood of a credit 
boom ending as it gets older may change after certain duration. The empirical findings indeed 
support the presence of a change-point: increasing positive duration dependence is observed 
in booms that last less than eight to ten quarters, but it becomes decreasing or even non-
relevant for longer events (according to the GVL-criteria). This evidence is robust to the 
criteria used to define credit booms (MT or GVL-criteria) and the sub-group of countries 
(Industrial or Developing) or time period (pre or post-1990) considered. Analogous results are 
found for those credit booms that end up in a systemic banking crisis (bad credit booms). 
The main messages of this paper are: first, that the evidence of true duration 
dependence is helpful in predicting credit boom episodes. The evidence of positive duration 
dependence implies that the risk of a credit boom ending in any particular time increases over 
time. If credit booms are characterised by positive duration dependence, then the duration 
analysis provides information which is useful in predicting turning points in the economy. 
Consequently, our finding of duration dependence provides evidence of predictability of 
credit booms. Second, our results with change-points suggest the presence of a breaking-point 
in credit boom episodes. The predictability of credit booms can be improved if they last less 
than 2 to 2 ½ years, according to the MT-criteria and GVL-criteria, respectively. However, 
the longer the credit boom persists – more than 2 or 2 ½ years – less predictable its end 
becomes, because the likelihood of their end is no longer dependent on its age, but probably 
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depends on other time-varying random factors. Finally, we also find robust evidence of 
positive duration dependence for bad credit booms. In this case, the risk of a credit boom 
ending up in a banking crisis increases over time. Additionally, the analysis with change-
points also suggests the presence of a breaking-point in credit boom episodes followed by 
systemic banking crisis. 
Thus, our findings indicate the ending of credit booms depends positively on the 
length of its life span. For the MT-criteria they also show that the mean duration of credit 
booms is higher in industrial countries than in developing countries, therefore, credit boom 
episodes are more persistent, on average, in industrial countries than in developing countries. 
The empirical evidence provided by the estimation of the Weibull model with change-points 
also supports the presence of (increasing) positive duration dependence. These results imply 
that, on average, the duration of credit booms lasts within 2 to 2 ½ years in the last decade for 
MT-criteria and GVL-criteria, respectively. Specifically, the duration with the MT-criteria 
lasts within 2.5 years for all and developing countries in the pre-1990 period while within 3 ¾ 
years for industrial countries for the post-1990 period. The case of GVL-criteria duration 
becomes slower: 2.5 to 3 ¾ years. 
All these results represent remarkable new findings in this field of the research and an 
important contribution to the literature and to a better understanding of the credit booms 
behaviour. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature 
on credit booms and duration analysis. Section 3 presents the econometric models. Section 4 
describes the data and the methodology. The empirical analysis and the discussion of the 
results are presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
This section reviews the theoretical and empirical literature of the drivers and 
consequences of credit booms and their duration. We first outline some empirical facts and 
theoretical arguments about the creation of credit booms. Then we review the few existing 
papers on the importance of the duration of credit booms when predicting financial and 
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economic downturns. Finally, we review some of empirical applications of duration analysis 
in the Economics literature.  
Rapid growth of domestic credit can take place in an economy due to the deepening of 
financial intermediaries (Levine, 2005), upswings in credit demand during normal output 
recoveries, and excessive cyclical fluctuations —or the so-called credit booms (Elekdag and 
Wu, 2011). In turn, credit booms are triggered, according to the literature, by (positive) 
productivity shocks, financial reforms, and surges in capital inflows (Dell’Ariccia et al. 2012). 
In fact, Mendoza and Terrones (2012) find that 20-50 percent of the peak of credit booms in 
industrial and emerging market economies is preceded by productivity surges, financial 
reforms, and massive capital inflow episodes. Elekdag and Wu (2011) add that loose 
monetary policy in industrial and emerging economies may have contributed to the build-up 
of credit booms prior to the 2008-9 global financial crises. They also corroborate the findings 
in the literature that longer credit booms are related to lower credit standards, deteriorating 
balance sheets among banks and corporations, and warning signs of overheating —such as, 
strong domestic demand, widening current account deficits, massive inflows of foreign 
finance and rising asset prices. 
Minsky (1986) suggested that a benign economic environment —characterized by 
high growth and low output volatility— would increase speculative investor euphoria and 
lead to excess risk taking. Debt would exceed what agents can pay-off from their proceeds, 
thus leading to a financial crisis. As the credit bubble bursts, banks will curtail credit not only 
to sub-prime borrowers but also to those that can afford to borrow, and the economy will 
subsequently enter into a spiral of recession. 
Recent theoretical efforts show that financial frictions can severely affect real 
economic activity. Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2012) build a dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium model where shocks are amplified and propagated through leverage and asset 
prices. Their model introduces a mechanism through which agents respond to exogenous 
declines in macroeconomic risk by increasing leverage (i.e. rapid increase in credit). 
Consequently, low exogenous risk environment (a feature of the Great Moderation period) 
would be conducive to a greater build-up of systemic risk. In this setting, low fundamental 
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risks (as signalled by low output volatility) leads to higher leverage (that is, longer and 
sharper credit expansions). In turn, the leverage build-up will lead to abrupt macroeconomic 
contractions. To put it simply, they argue that financial crises and, hence, recessions are more 
likely to take place, the longer an economy builds up booms in financial markets —and, more 
specifically, booms in credit markets. 
Understanding the genesis and drivers of financial booms is important due to their 
devastating consequences on real economic activity. Claessens, Kose and Terrones (2012) 
provide an analysis of the linkages between real and financial cycles and, more specifically, 
the influence of financial booms (either in credit or asset prices) on the duration and 
amplitude of recessions and recoveries in real economic activity. They find that boom-bust 
financial cycles are highly synchronized with real cycles and, consequently, affect the 
duration and strength of recessions and recoveries. In particular, recessions associated with 
financial disruptions —that is, credit crunches and/or housing price busts— tend to be longer 
and deeper, and their ensuing recoveries are slightly shorter and stronger when combined with 
booms in financial markets. As financial disruptions are associated with longer and deeper 
recessions, recoveries associated with credit or housing price booms are associated with 
stronger output growth. Levine (2005) shows that credit expansions can lead to higher growth 
although these expansions may heighten aggregate volatility and the likelihood of banking 
crisis (Reinhart and Kaminsky, 1999; Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002). 
Barajas, Dell’Ariccia and Levchenko (2009) examine empirically the nature of credit 
booms —especially those that end up in a full blown banking crisis. They suggest that the 
probability of banking distress will increase the longer a credit boom in an economy is. 
Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) argue that financial crises in advanced and emerging market 
economies over the last century have been preceded by financial booms —that, typically, take 
the form of rapid growth of domestic credit and large appreciation of the domestic currency. 
Schularick and Taylor (2012) confirm this result for 14 advanced countries over the period 
1870-2008. They argue that failures in the operation, regulation and/or supervision of the 
financial system have led to recurrent episodes of financial instability. In turn, these episodes 
are the outcome of "credit booms gone wrong." Barajas et al. (2009), in addition, show that it 
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is not only the amplitude of the credit boom but also its duration that help predict future 
systemic banking crisis. In sum, understanding the duration of credit boom is of crucial 
importance given its consequences on the financial sector and economic activity. 
The literature argues that credit booms do not always end up in systemic crises. For 
instance, Tornell and Westermann (2002) that the probability of a systemic banking crisis in a 
given country i at time T, conditional on a lending boom, is around 6 percent. Barajas et al. 
(2009) find that approximately 16 percent of lending booms have preceded systemic banking 
crises and that this likelihood will rise to 23 percent if non-systemic episodes of financial 
distress are included. In addition, they find that there are size and duration thresholds above 
which credit booms inevitably are followed by a crisis —approximately 40% of credit booms 
that last between 9 and 12 years end up in a crisis, whereas all credit booms over 13 years will 
invariably are followed by financial turmoil. These findings suggest that hard landing does 
not necessarily follow a boom in credit markets —especially so for shorter booms. However, 
longer booms (especially those over 12 years) may reflect either excessive risk taking or 
cronyism. In the light of these empirical findings, it might be important to distinguish whether 
the effects of surging capital inflows may be differ when explaining the incidence of credit 
booms that end up in a crisis (i.e. bad credit booms) from those credit booms followed by a 
soft landing (which we can denote as "good" credit booms). 
Capital inflows and credit booms. Capital flows play an important role in driving 
credit booms —with the probability of credit booms being preceded by surges in capital 
inflows being larger among emerging market economies than among industrial countries 
(Elekdag and Wu, 2011). In particular, the sharp movements in capital flows – as a result of 
the recent globalization process – have put the emphasis of the analysis on the link between 
those flows and developments in domestic financial markets. Recent theoretical research has 
modelled the linkages between capital flows and banking leverage through the mechanisms 
that leads to rising gross flows of foreign financing in the banking sector (Bruno and Shin, 
2012). They tend to show that gross capital flows move in the opposite direction of risk 
premia in capital markets, reflecting the sensitivity of bank leverage to risk premia. 
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Furceri et al. (2011) examine the relationship between capital inflows and credit in a 
dynamic perspective. They calculate the dynamic response (IRFs) of domestic credit to 
capital inflow shocks using an annual data from 1970 to 2007 for developed and emerging 
market economies and show that in the event of a capital inflow shock, the ratio of credit to 
GDP tends to increase during the first two years following the shock but the effect is reversed 
in the medium-term. They also find that the macroeconomic policy stance of the country may 
help mitigate the short-term effect of these shocks. 
Calderon and Kubota (2012) use quarterly data for a wide array of countries to 
examine the dynamic relationship between gross inflows and credit booms. They find that an 
increase in gross capital inflows is more likely to predict subsequent credit booms. They also 
show that not all types of gross inflows have the same predictive ability: while surges in 
equity-type flows have no relationship or, at best, reduce the probability of build-ups in credit, 
a massive inflow of debt-type securities would raise the likelihood of credit booms. 
On the other hand, the literature shows that these surges in capital inflows lead to a 
rapid build-up of leverage which, in turn, may lead to financial fragility (Borio and Disyatat, 
2011; Gourinchas and Obstfeld, 2012). A massive rising inflows of foreign capital may lead 
to excessive monetary and credit expansions (Sidaoui et al., 2011), increase the vulnerability 
associated to currency and maturity mismatches (Akyuz, 2009), create distortions in asset 
prices (Agnello and Sousa, 2012a; Agnello et al., 2012a) and, consequently, lead to stock and 
housing price bubbles as well as an overvaluation of the real exchange rate (Magud et al., 
2012). Recent empirical efforts show that the flexibility of the exchange rate arrangement 
may act as counteract the impact of gross inflows on credit expansions. Magud et. al (2012) 
show that surges of capital inflows in countries with less flexible monetary arrangements lead 
to a more rapid credit expansion and to a shift towards foreign currency. As shown in Calvo 
et. al (2004, 2008), the vulnerability to capital inflow reversals is greater in countries with 
more inflexible exchange rate regimes. These reversals, in turn, could potentially trigger 
credit busts and asset price deflation with deleterious effects on real economic activity. 
These studies explore deeply the links between credit booms, capital flows, crises and 
the respective outcomes, but neglect the issue of their duration, which is another important 
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dimension to understand the credit booms behaviour. Moreover, as the historical analysis 
shows the presence of several events of credit booms, with similar outcomes but different 
durations, the issue of their duration analysis gains even more relevance. 
Having flourished in the engineering and medical fields, the duration analysis rapidly 
spread out to other sciences. In economics, it started to be employed in labour economics to 
assess the duration of periods of unemployment.
1
 It has also been widely used in the analysis 
of the duration of the business cycle phases.
2
 A basic Weibull model is usually employed in 
those studies with the aim of finding duration dependence in the phases of the business cycle, 
i.e. whether the likelihood of expansions and recessions ending is dependent on its age or not. 
However, this model assumes that the behaviour of duration dependence is smooth over the 
entire duration of the event, which may not be true. Given this limitation, Castro (2012) 
adapts the Weibull model with change-points proposed by Lara-Porras et al. (2005) to the 
analysis of the duration of the business cycle phases. This author shows that positive duration 
dependence in expansions is no longer present when they last more than ten years, which 
proves the presence of a change-point in the duration of economic expansions. 
Other studies also show the presence of duration dependence in different dimensions 
of the economy. For instance, Bracke (2011) and Cunningham and Kolet (2011) show that the 
likelihood of housing booms and busts ending is positively dependent on their age. More 
recently, Agnello et al. (2012b) provide some evidence indicating that fiscal consolidations 
are also duration dependent. 
Due to its properties, this kind of analysis is also suitable for studying the duration of 
credit booms. Hence, we employ a continuous-time Weibull model to investigate the presence 
of duration dependence in a large group of countries over the last decades. Additionally, we 
also control for the presence of change-points in the structure of the model. In the next 
section, we describe the aplication of these models to the study of the duration of credit 
booms. This analysis represents an important contribution to the economic literature in this 
field and it intends to contribute to a better understanding of the credit booms behaviour. 
                                                 
1
 See Allison (1982) and Kiefer (1988) for a review of the literature on duration analysis. 
2
 See, for example, Sichel (1991), Zuehlke (2003), Davig (2007) and Castro (2010, 2012). 
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3. Econometric models 
This section describes the duration analysis techniques conducted in our empirical paper –
more, specifically, the basic Weibull model and a Weibull model with change-points. 
3.1. Duration analysis 
We start by assuming that the duration variable is defined as the number of periods 
(quarters) a credit boom is taking place. If T measures the time span between the beginning of 
a credit boom and its end, then t1, t2,…,tn will represent its observed duration. The probability 
distribution of the duration variable, T, can be specified by the cumulative distribution 
function, F(t)=Pr(T<t), and the corresponding density function is f(t)=dF(t)/dt. Alternatively, 
the distribution of T can be characterized by the survivor function, S(t)=Pr(T≥t)=1-F(t), 
which measures the probability that the duration of a credit boom phase is larger or equal to t. 
A particularly useful function for duration analysis is the hazard function such as: 
 
     (1) 
 
which measures the rate at which credit boom spells end at time t, given that they lasted until 
that moment. In other words, it measures the probability of exiting from a state in moment t 
conditional on the length of time in that state. This function helps characterizing the path of 
duration dependence. For instance: (i) if dh(t)/dt>0 for t=t
*
, there is positive duration 
dependence in t
*
; (ii) if dh(t)/dt<0 for t=t
*
, then there is negative duration dependence in t
*
; 
and (iii) if dh(t)/dt=0 for t=t
*
, there is no duration dependence. Therefore, when the derivative 
of the hazard function with respect to time is positive, the probability of a credit boom ending 
in moment t, given that it has reached t
*
, increases with its age. Thus, the longer the credit 
boom is, the higher the conditional probability of its end will be. 
From the hazard function, we can derive the integrated hazard function such that: 
 
     (2) 
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and compute the survivor function as follows: 
 
      (3) 
 
While different parametric countinuous-time duration models can measure the magnitude of 
duration dependence and the impact of other time-invariant variables on the likelihood of an 
event ending, the most commonly used functional form of the hazard function is the 
proportional hazard model as: 
 
    (4) 
 
where h0(t) is the baseline hazard function that captures the data dependence of duration and 
represents an unknown parameter to be estimated, β is a (K×1) vector of parameters that need 
to be estimated and x is a vector of covariates. The proportional hazard model can be 
estimated without imposing any specific functional form to the baseline hazard function (the 
so called "Cox model"). Given the inappropriateness of this procedure (in particular, for 
studying duration dependence), a popular alternative imposes a specific parametric form for 
the function h0(t) (i.e. the "Weibull model"). 
 
3.2. The basic Weibull model 
The Weibull model is characterized by the following (baseline) hazard function as: 
 
     (5) 
 
where p parameterizes the duration dependence, t denotes time, γ is a constant, p>0 and γ>0. 
If p>1, the conditional probability of a turning point occurring increases as the phase gets 
older, i.e. there is positive duration dependence; if p<1 there is negative duration dependence; 
finally, there is no duration dependence if p=1. In this last case, the Weibull model is equal to 
an Exponential model. Therefore, by estimating p, we can test for duration dependence in 
credit boom phases. 
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If we plug the Weibull specification for the baseline hazard function as expressed by 
equation (5) in the proportional hazard function denoted by (4), we get: 
 
     (6) 
 
Hence, the corresponding survivor function can be written as: 
 
   (7) 
 
This model can be estimated by Maximum Likelihood, and the log-likelihood function 
for a sample of i=1,…,n boom episodes is given by: 
 
 
    (8) 
 
where ci indicates when observations are censored. If the sample period under analysis ends 
before the turning point has been observed, then observations will be censored (i.e. ci=0); 
when the turning points are observed in the sample period, the observations are not censored 
(in which case, ci=1). 
 
3.3. A Weibull model with change-points 
While the basic structure of the log-likelihood function for the Weibull model allows 
us to analyze the presence of duration dependence in credit boom phases, we also move a step 
further in that we assess the extent to which the likelihood of a boom ending as it gets older 
changes after a certain duration. Thus, we allow for the possibility of a structural break in the 
Weibull model and conjecture that the parameters of the baseline hazard function (p and γ) 
can change at a certain point (i.e. the "change-point") in time. In particular, we expect that the 
degree of duration dependence, p, changes after the event has lasted more than a certain time. 
Consequently, we do not only expect that the likelihood of a credit boom phase ending 
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increases over time, but also that if it has lasted more than a certain time, the likelihood of 
ending may change significantly after that point, that is, the magnitude of duration 
dependence may decrease or increase from that point onwards. 
We propose a Weibull model for credit boom phases with change-points that follows 
the general model framework developed by Lara-Porras et al. (2005) and Castro (2012) for 
cases where the Weibull distribution, or the respective parameters characterizing the baseline 
hazard function, varies over time for different intervals, but remain constant within each 
interval. For simplicity, let us re-write equation (5) as: 
 
     (9) 
 
where γ=λp. Hence, the survival function becomes: 
 
  (10) 
 
Denoting g(t)=lnH(t) and considering a change point, τc, and two intervals, t0<t≤τc and 
τc<t≤tT, g(t) can be expressed as: 
 
      (11) 
 
with j=1,2. Due to the fact that the continuity of g(t) in the change-point, τc has to be verified, 
we must impose that: 
 
     (12) 
 
Solving this equation with respect to p2, we get: 
 
       (13) 
 
Consequently, in the case of the survival time ending in the first interval, we have that: 
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      (14) 
 
and, similarly, for the following survival time ending in the second interval: 
 
     (15) 
 
Considering the i-th spell (or individual), we get: 
 
   (16) 
 
where di=1 if t0<t≤τc, di=0 if τc<t≤tT, and i=1,2,...,n (i.e. the number of spells). 
For H(ti,xi)=exp[g(ti)+β′xi], the hazard function is given by: 
 
 (17) 
 
and the corresponding survivor function can be expressed as: 
 
     (18) 
 
Therefore, the log-likelihood function can be written as: 
 
 (19) 
 
where 
)ln(
)ln(
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p
dtg


 . This model is estimated by Maximum Likelihood, 
given a particular change-point τc. The relevance of the change-point is evaluated by testing 
whether there is a statistically significant difference between p1 and p2, i.e. whether the 
duration dependence parameter changes significantly between the two sub-periods. 
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4. Data and Methodology 
This section describes the definition and sources of the data for our empirical 
assessment and the strategy to identify credit booms. Then we show the descriptive statistics 
for the episodes and duration of credit booms and identify the duration of credit booms. 
To proceed with the duration analysis, we collected quarterly data for 71 countries (23 
industrial economies and 48 emerging market economies) from 1975q1 to 2010q4 on real 
credit. The measure of credit considered in our analysis is the deposit money bank claims on 
the private sector taken from the line 22d of the IMF's International Financial Statistics (IFS). 
We express the amount of credit in real terms by dividing the nominal credit by the CPI index 
(at the end of the quarter). Other measures of credit considered in this study are the ratio of 
real credit to GDP and the leverage of the banking system. The latter indicator is computed as 
the ratio of private credit to bank deposits where deposits are measured as the sum of demand 
and time deposits (IFS lines 24 and 25, respectively). 
However, our aim is to identify credit booms to compute the respective duration. 
Defining a credit boom is not easy because there is no consensus in the literature on the best 
methodology to identify them. Some studies use the amount of real credit provided by the 
banking system; others use the bank lending normalized by either total population or the 
amount of goods produced in the real economy. In this study we decided to focus on the 
criteria used by Calderón and Kubota (2012) for their analysis on the effects of surges in 
private capital inflows over credit booms. In their paper they consider the following criteria 
from the literature on credit booms: (i) Mendoza and Terrones (2008) or MT-criteria; and (ii) 
Gourinchas, Valdes and Landarretche (2001) or GVL-criteria, which is later implemented and 
updated by Barajas, Dell'Ariccia and Levchenko (2009). 
In the criteria defined by Mendoza and Terrones (2008) to identify credit booms, an 
episode of credit boom takes place whenever the amount of credit extended by the banking 
system to the private sector grows by more than its experience during a typical cyclical 
expansion. The amount of real credit per capita, itl , is the key variable to identify a boom in 
lending. They denote itl
~
 as the deviation of (the log of) real credit per capita from its long-run 
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trend (or its cyclical component), and  itl
~
  as its corresponding standard deviation. In this 
study, we follow Mendonza and Terrones' (2008) strategy in computing the long-run trend of 
real credit per capita using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. 
A country is considered to have experienced a credit boom if it has one or more 
subsequent quarters where the condition  itit ll
~~
  holds. The factor   is a threshold factor 
set by Mendonza and Terrones (2008) at 1.75. We adopted this factor as a basis for our 
analysis, but we also consider other values of   (1.5 and 2.0) to evaluate the robustness of 
our results. Note that the peak date of the credit boom, tˆ , takes place in the quarter that 
maximizes the deviation   itit ll
~~
  from the set of contiguous quarters while it satisfies the 
condition stated above. Once tˆ  has been determined, the starting period of the credit boom St  
is such that tt S ˆ  and it yields the smallest value for   itSit ll
~~
  while the final period of 
the boom Ft  is such that tt F ˆ  and also yields the smallest value for   itFit ll
~~
  where 
1 FS  . 
For robustness, we also consider the GVL-criteria to identify credit booms. This 
method identifies a credit boom by looking at the growth of credit in the economy as proxied 
by the bank credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP, L/y. Thus, Gourinchas et al. 
(2001) define a credit boom as an episode where the deviation of the ratio L/y from a country-
specific trend in country i at period t (with the trend being calculated up to that period t) 
exceeds a determined threshold. In particular, a credit boom takes place if the ratio of private 
credit to GDP meets either of the following two conditions: (i) the deviation of L/y from its 
estimated trend, say L/y, is greater than 1.5 times its standard deviation and the year-on-year 
growth rate of L/y exceeds 10 percent, and/or (ii) the year-on-year growth rate in the ratio L/y 
exceeds 20 percent.
3
 We also adopted this procedure but, like in the MT-criteria, we 
considered other thresholds in a robustness analysis: 1.75 and 2.0. 
                                                 
3
 According to Barajas et al. (2009), the starting and final quarter of the identified credit boom is defined 
accordingly. The beginning of the episode is the earliest year in which L/y is greater than ¾, its standard 
deviation and the annual growth rate of L/y exceeds 5 percent, or the annual growth rate of L/y exceeds 10 
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These methodologies offer some differences. The MT-criteria uses the real credit per 
capita to identify booms in credit markets whereas the GVL-criteria use the ratio of credit to 
GDP. Both criteria use the HP-filter to compute the trend in credit and apply a rolling variant 
of the filter that takes information up to the moment where the deviation is computed. 
Thresholds are country-specific rather than based on the cross-sectional distribution of 
countries. Like Calderón and Kubota (2012), we use quarterly information on credit, which, 
as they argue, is more appropriate to assess cyclical movements and volatility associated to 
crisis episodes.
4
 
We collect quarterly information on real credit provided by the banking system to the 
private sector for 71 countries from 1975q1 to 2010q4 to identify the credit boom episodes 
according to the two criteria outlined above. Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics for 
the number of episodes identified (Obs.), their mean duration (Mean), standard deviation 
(S.D.), minimum (Min.) and maximum (Max.). Industrial and Developing countries and 
different periods of time are also considered in this analysis. 
 
<Insert Table 1 around here> 
 
Using the MT-criteria we are able to identify 123 credit boom episodes over our entire 
time dimension -- of which 32 episodes took place in Industrial economies and 91 in 
Developing countries. Over time, most episodes of lending booms occur in the 1990s (50). On 
the other hand, when we use the GVL-criteria, we are able to identify a larger number of 
episodes (231), especially in the period 2000-2010 (98).
5
 Most of them also occur in the 
group of Developing countries (180). 
                                                                                                                                                        
percent. Analogously, the end quarter of the boom is determined if either the year-on-year growth rate of L/y 
becomes negative, or L/y falls below ¾ times its standard deviation and its growth rate is lower than 20 percent. 
4
 The HP-filter is used to compute the trend, where the value of Lagrange multiplier employed in the 
maximization problem is λ=1600 (for quarterly data) rather than the value of 100 used in the MT-criteria to 
decompose the annual data. 
5
 This means that the GVL criteria allow us to identify many episodes of credit booms in the run-up to the recent 
global financial crisis. 
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By organizing the data in spells – where a spell represents the number of years that a 
credit boom lasts and it is denoted by Dur – we are able to compute their mean duration.6 
According to the MT-criteria, credit booms last on average around 6.1 quarters, but they last 
longer in the group of Industrial countries (7.5) than in the group of Developing countries 
(5.6) – see Table 1. According to the GVL-criteria they tend to last a bit more (about 8.5 
quarters), either for Industrial or Developing countries. Whether there is any significant 
difference or not in the duration of credit booms between these groups of countries is 
something that we will test below in the empirical analysis. In particular, we will test whether 
there is a significant difference in the average duration of credit booms, as well as in the 
duration dependence parameter (p) between these two groups of countries. This will be done 
by including the dummy D_Indus in the model, which takes the value of 1 for Industrial 
countries and 0 otherwise. Moreover, some separate regressions for each of these groups will 
also be considered. 
Additionally, we observe in Table 1 that the average duration of credit booms has 
increased over the last decades, independently of the criteria used. Whether this evidence is 
statistically solid is another issue that we will explore in the empirical analysis using dummies 
for each decade (Dec70, Dec80, Dec90, Dec00). Following Castro (2012), we also consider a 
kind of a trend variable for the credit boom spells, labelled as Event, to check whether their 
duration has become gradually longer or shorter over time. This variable reports the order or 
observation number of each event over time and for every single country: it is equal to 1 for 
the first event, 2 for the second, and so on. If the coefficient on this variable is significantly 
smaller (larger) than zero, phase durations get longer (shorter) over time or, better, from spell 
to spell. 
 
5. Empirical Analysis 
This section investigates whether there is positive duration dependence in credit boom 
episodes using quarterly data from 1975q1 to 2010q4 for both industrial and developing 
countries (23 and 48, respectively). We also conduct a test whether there is positive duration 
                                                 
6
 The variable Dur corresponds to t_{i} in the model described in the previous Section. 
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dependence in bad credit booms followed a systemic banking crisis. We analyse the results 
from the basic Weibull duration model and the model with change-points. Finally, we conduct 
a series of robustness checks. 
5.1. The baseline model 
The empirical evidence that emerges from the estimation of the basic Weibull model 
presented in sub-Section 3.2 is summarized in Tables 2 and 3. These tables are divided in two 
blocks, one for each criterion used to define credit booms: the MT-criteria and the GVL-
criteria. We start by recalling that the estimate of p measures the magnitude of the duration 
dependence and γ corresponds to the estimate of the constant term. A one-sided test is used to 
detect the presence of positive duration dependence (i.e. whether p>1) and the sign '+' 
indicates significance at a 5% level. 
The results reported in Table 2 provide strong evidence of positive duration 
dependence for credit booms, either using the MT-criteria or the GVL-criteria. This means 
that the likelihood of a credit boom ending increases as the time goes by. This is robust for all 
regressions presented in this table although significant differences arise in the dynamic path 
of this likelihood between the MT-criteria and the GVL-criteria. the probability of credit 
booms ending at time t, provided that they lasted until that period grows over time at an 
increasing rate according to the MT-criteria, but at a decreasing rate according to the GVL-
criteria.
7
 For instance, p is in most of the cases statistically greater than 2 when the MT-
criteria is used, therefore, the statistical analysis of the second-order derivative of the baseline 
hazard function indicates the presence of constant positive duration dependence in credit 
booms. On the other hand, p is lower than 2 in most cases when the GVL criteria is used; that 
is, there is evidence of a decreasing duration dependence in the GVL-defined credit booms. 
Our result is in line with the shorter mean duration of the credit booms identified by the MT-
criteria, as observed above in the descriptive statistics. Nevertheless, we should emphasize 
that positive duration dependence is present in the duration of credit booms independently of 
the criteria used to identify them. 
                                                 
7
 See Castro (2010, 2012) for details on the analysis of the second-order derivative of the baseline hazard 
function. 
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<Insert Table 2 around here> 
 
We assumed that credit booms may have a length from one quarter to the maximum 
observable in our sample although, according to our characterization, their minimum duration 
is higher than one (it is two – see Table 1). Therefore, our duration analysis evaluates whether 
truncating the booms at their minimum duration affects the results or not. Consequently, the 
hazard rate must be identically zero for the first quarter and some non-zero value thereafter. 
Truncation is made at the minimum observable durations: d0=min(di)-1, where min(di) is the 
shortest boom observed in the sample (two, in our case). This means that the survival function 
is now: 
 
     (20) 
 
Truncation is allowed for in the regressions presented in Column 2 of Table 2, but the 
results are not affected by this "small" truncation. This implies that positive duration 
dependence is still present in credit booms regardless the criteria used to define these booms. 
In general, results in the duration research are generally not sensitive to the choice of this 
minimum observable duration and the qualitative conclusions tend to be identical in any 
case.
8
 Thus, we will carry on with our analysis without taking into account this intricacy in 
the model. 
In the regressions presented in column 1, we also assume that the population of 
individual spells is homogeneous, i.e. each credit boom is under the same risk of ending. 
Given that this may not represent the reality, the regressions in column 3 allow for the 
presence of unobserved heterogeneity or frailty. In statistical terms, a frailty model is similar 
to a random-effects model for duration analysis: it represents an unobserved random 
proportionality factor that modifies the hazard function of an individual spell and accounts for 
heterogeneity caused by unmeasured covariates or measurement errors. In order to include 
                                                 
8
 See, for example, Sichel (1991), Layton and Smith (2007) and Castro (2010, 2012). 
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frailty in the Weibull model, the hazard function expressed by equation (6) is modified as 
follows: 
 
      (21) 
 
where v is an unobserved individual-spell effect that scales the no-frailty component. The 
random variable v is assumed to be positive with unity mean, finite variance (θ) and 
independently distributed from t and x. The survival function becomes: 
 
      (22) 
 
Since the values of v are not observed, we cannot estimate them. Therefore, we follow 
Lancaster (1990) and assume v follows a Gamma distribution with unity mean and variance θ. 
Consequently, the frailty survival function can be written as: 
 
    (23) 
 
the frailty hazard function becomes: 
 
    (24) 
 
and the corresponding log-likelihood function can be expressed as: 
 
 (25) 
 
The variance parameter (θ), which measures the presence (or absence) of unobserved 
heterogeneity, is an additional parameter that needs to be estimated. As θ is always greater 
than zero, the limiting distribution of the maximum-likelihood estimate of θ is a normal 
distribution that is halved or chopped-off at the zero-bound. Therefore, the likelihood ratio 
test (LR test) used to detect its presence is a `boundary' test that takes in account the fact that 
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the null distribution is not the usual chi-squared with one degree of freedom, but rather a 
mixture of a chi-squared with no degrees of freedom and a chi-squared with one degree of 
freedom (Gutierrez et al., 2001). The results show some evidence of unobserved 
heterogeneity, as corroborated by the p-value of the LR test reported at the bottom of column 
3: at a 5% level we do not reject the presence of frailty either using the MT-criteria or GVL-
criteria. This can be due to the omission of some relevant conditionings. According to Jenkins 
(2005, p. 81) omitted variables are one reason for the presence of frailty in the model. Hence, 
in the next regressions we will control for that problem including some additional regressors 
in the equation.
9
 
In particular, frailty can be linked to the presence of individual country-specific effects 
in the model. Therefore, in the regressions in column 4 we add country-dummy variables to 
the equation. In this case, the test for pooling, i.e. the LR test, is used to assess whether the 
model controlling for country-specific effects is preferred to simple pooling. The p-value of 
the LR test reported at the bottom of column 4 supports the existence of those effects. 
However, Claessens et al. (2011, p.17) points out that having only a limited number of 
observations/spells per country – which is our case – fixed effects may have to be ruled out. 
In fact, we had some difficulties in achieving convergence when country-dummies are 
included in the model, especially when other regressors are used. Hence, we decided to 
simplify the analysis considering only two sets of countries that present some homogeneity 
inside each group, but that are heterogeneous between then: Industrial and Developing 
countries. This procedure (partially) solves the problems faced with the use of country-
dummies – controlling for eventual individual or group heterogeneity – and allow us to test 
for differences in the mean duration of credit booms between those two groups of countries. 
Thus, in Column 5, we add the dummy variable D_Indus to the model. We observe 
that the coefficient associated to this variable is negative and statistically significant when the 
MT-criteria is considered. This suggests that, on average, credit booms tend to last longer in 
                                                 
9
 We should stress that when we tried to control for frailty with those additional regressors the model did not 
achieve convergence. Therefore, we conduct our analysis with the more parsimonious structure for the Weibull 
model. 
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the group of Industrial countries.
10
 However, when the GVL-criteria is used no significant 
differences are found in the mean duration of credit booms between Industrial and 
Developing countries. These two findings are well in line with what we have observed in the 
descriptive statistics (see Table 1). 
Another issue that can be analysed here is whether the duration dependence parameter 
is the same for Industrial and Developing countries or not. To analyze this issue, we start by 
replacing the parameter p by p+ΔpD_Indus in the regressions presented in column 6 to 
directly estimate that difference (i.e. Δp); in column 7, we also include the dummy D_Indus. 
When the MT-criteria is used, we observe a significant difference in the the duration 
dependence parameter between those two groups of countries (column 6), however, that 
difference becomes statistically insignificant when the dummy D_Indus is added to the 
equation (see column 7). This means that the main difference between them is in the mean 
duration of credit booms and not in the duration dependence parameter: evidence of positive 
duration dependence is found for both groups of countries, as shown in the regression in 
column 7 or even in the separate regressions for Industrial and Developing countries 
presented in columns 8 and 9, respectively. However, despite the duration dependence 
parameter begin statistically similar, our findings indicate the presence of increasing duration 
dependence in the first group and constant duration dependence in the second. Hence, the rate 
at which credit booms end in the group of industrial countries is slightly higher, even though 
the difference is not statistically significant. 
When we employ the GVL-criteria, no significant differences are observed either in 
the duration dependence parameter or in the mean duration of credit booms between those 
groups of countries. Nevertheless, we should note that: (i) like in the MT-criteria, the rate at 
which credit booms end in the group of Industrial countries is slightly higher than in the group 
of Developing countries (even though this difference is not significant); (ii) but, unlike the 
MT-criteria, we observe constant positive duration dependence in the first group (instead of 
increasing) and decreasing (instead of constant) positive duration dependence in the second. 
This conclusion is corroborated in the separate regressions presented in columns 8 and 9. 
                                                 
10
 Note that a negative coefficient means a lower probability of the event ending over time, i.e a longer duration. 
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In sum, our findings show that credit booms are duration dependent. In particular, they 
show that the likelihood of these events ending increases over time, at an increasing rate if 
they are defined using the MT-criteria, but at a decreasing rate if the GVL-criteria is used 
instead. Moreover, with the MT-criteria we also observe that the mean duration of credit 
booms is higher in the group of Industrial countries than in the group of Developing countries. 
As we are using a continuous-time duration model, there is no scope to include 
regressors that vary over time, but it is possible to consider a few that remain constant over 
each spell. The dummy D_Indus, included in some regressions above, is one example. Other 
possible regressors are the trend variable Event for spells and the dummies for the decades 
(Dec80, Dec90, Dec00). These additional regressors are included in the first two regressions 
presented in Table 3 to collect for possible time effects. The results confirm the presence of 
positive duration dependence (increasing with the MT-criteria and decreasing with the GVL-
criteria) and a lower likelihood of credit booms ending for Industrial countries (with the MT-
criteria). Moreover, the negative coefficient on Event shows that credit booms have become 
longer from spell to spell, but its effect has not proved to be statistically significant, When 
controlling for time-effects using dummies for the decades, however, we are able to unveil 
significant effects. The results indicate that the likelihood of a credit boom ending indeed 
decreases over time, especially in the 1900s and 2000s. To collect this effect more precisely, 
we created another dummy to group these two decades: D90_10. This dummy takes the value 
of one for the period between 1990 and 2010, and zero otherwise. Both regressions presented 
in column 3 confirm that, on average, credit booms have indeed become longer after 1990.
11
 
This implies that longer credit booms may be associated to increasing financial globalization. 
The rapid expansion of global asset trade —as observed by the increased financial 
globalization over the last 25 years— has led to rising gross inflows and higher levels of 
activity in credit markets. Claessens et al. (2012) show that greater financial openness reduces 
the duration of downturns in credit markets and that it may also increase the duration of credit 
booms. Hence, we can infer that the greater duration dependence can be perceived as a 
                                                 
11
 These findings are also in line with what we have observed in the descriptive statistics (see Table 1) 
 25 
consequence of the increasing globalization process, deeper integration and liberalization of 
some markets and economies and higher capital mobility observed since the 1990s. 
 
<Insert Table 3 around here> 
 
Similarly to what we did above for the groups of Industrial and Developing countries, 
we also analyze here whether the duration dependence parameter is the same or not before 
and after 1990. Hence, we replace the parameter p by p+ΔpD90_10 in the regressions 
presented in column 4 to directly estimate that difference (i.e. Δp); in column 5, we also 
include the dummy D90_10. We observe a significant difference in the duration dependence 
parameter between those two periods (column 4) and that difference remains significant when 
the dummy D90_10 is included, especially in the GVL-criteria (see column 5). However, the 
coefficient on the dummy looses its statistical significance. Hence, the main difference 
between these two periods is more in the duration dependence parameter than in the mean 
duration of credit booms. In fact, separate regressions in columns 6 and 7 for the pre- and 
post-1990 periods, respectively, show that the difference in the constant parameter γ is 
negligible while the difference in the duration dependence parameter is substantial, especially 
when the GVL-criteria is considered. This might mean that this second criteria is more 
sensitive to the higher duration of credit booms in the last few years. In fact, the GVL-criteria 
allow us to identify many episodes of credit booms in the run-up to the recent global financial 
crisis as well as booms that have occurred during the recovery that followed the recent crisis. 
Moreover, with these criteria we observe the presence of constant positive duration 
dependence in the pre-1990 period and decreasing duration dependence in the post-1990 
period, which reflects the higher propensity for longer credit booms in the recent years.
12
 As a 
result, the recent financial globalization leads to longer trough-to-peak cycles in credit —and 
more specifically, longer credit booms, especially in industrial countries. 
                                                 
12
 However, this evidence is not so clear when the MT-criteria is used: both duration dependence parameters (for 
pre- and post-1990 periods) present evidence of increasing duration dependence and their difference is not 
statistically significant (see columns 5 to 7). 
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Are all credit booms alike? Looking at the duration dependence of bad credit booms. 
We test whether there is a positive duration dependence in bad credit booms. It is clear 
from the literature that not all credit booms end in crisis —most of them are followed by soft 
landing (Tornell and Westermann, 2002; Barajas et al. 2009; Calderón and Servén, 2011). 
More specifically, it is likely that one out of four credit boom episodes will end with a 
currency or a banking crisis (Mendoza and Terrones, 2012). Table 4 provides these results for 
bad credit booms followed a systemic banking crisis. 
Independently of the criteria used, we robustly find the presence of positive duration 
dependence for bad credit booms —which evolves at a constant pace over time. 
Consequently, bad credit booms have a greater propensity to end over time. This evidence is 
even more robust when we estimate the model with a change-point. Here, our findings show 
that the likelihood of bad credit booms ending increases at a faster pace for those that last less 
than 10 quarters. For those episodes with longer duration, their respective likelihood increases 
at a decreasing rate. This implies that they tend to persist for a bit longer once they pass that 
threshold. The difference between the parameters (p₂-p₁) is also statistically significant which 
supports the suitability of the change-points Weibull model to the analysis of the duration of 
bad credit booms. 
Regarding the effect of the additional regressors, we are not able to find any 
significant impact. The coefficients on D_Indus, Event and D90_10 fail to be statistically 
significant. Hence, there are not significant differences in the level of the duration dependence 
coefficient between industrial and developing countries (column 2) or pre- vis-à-vis after 
1990 (column 4).
13
 
Thus, our results show the presence of positive duration dependence and of a change-
point in the duration of bad credit booms, independently of the criteria used to define them 
(MT or GVL) and the sub-group of countries (Industrial or Developing) or time period (pre- 
or post-1990) considered. Therefore, we robustly find that bad credit booms also tend to die 
out within two years and a half. 
                                                 
13
 We also controlled for decade dummies. The estimated coefficients for these dummies were not statistically 
significant. 
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<Insert Table 4 around here> 
 
5.2. The model with change-points in duration dependence 
The results presented in Tables 2 and 3 rely on the assumption that the magnitude of 
the duration dependence parameter is invariant whatever the duration of the credit booms 
spells is. In Figure 1, we plot the survivor functions for credit booms for all countries, 
Industrial and Developing countries and pre- and post-1990 periods, regarding the two 
concepts to define credit booms (the MT and GVL-criteria). It is clear that the probability (or 
proportion) of a credit boom surviving after duration ti substantially decreases as they become 
older. This sharp decline is consistent with the existence of positive duration dependence. 
Moreover, the survivor functions quickly fall until ti=8 – for all the cases considering the MT-
criteria – and until ti=10 (for all and Developing countries and for the pre-1990 period) or 
ti=15 (for the Industrial countries and for the post-1990 period) – for the cases considering the 
GVL-criteria – but, and these evolve at a slower pace. This highlights the possibility of breaks 
in duration dependence and it is necessary to have a more flexible framework allowing for 
change-points in the Weibull distribution at τc=8 (MT-criteria) and τc=10 or τc=15 (GVL-
criteria). In fact, Figure 1 suggests that the magnitude of duration dependence parameter 
might be lower when credit booms are longer than those values and the likelihood of their 
ending can significantly change above those thresholds.
14
 Thus, there is significant evidence 
to suspect that change-points in the duration of credit booms may indeed exist. 
 
<Insert Figure 1 around here> 
                                                 
14
 Another signal of the existence of a break-point in duration dependence for credit booms is provided by the 
slope of the survivor functions. For example, in the case of the full sample, our computations show that the 
average slope, considering the MT-criteria (GVL-criteria), is equal to -0.128 (-0.090) for booms that are shorter 
than 8 (10) quarters and -0.020 (-0.013) for those that last longer than 8 (10) quarters. Putting it differently, when 
credit booms have a duration shorter than 8 (10) quarters, each additional quarter of duration, on average, 
increases the likelihood of they ending by about 12.8 (9.0) percentage points. In contrast, when they have a 
length longer than 8 (10) quarters, each additional quarter of duration rises the likelihood of they ending by only 
2.0 (1.3) percentage points. Similar conclusions were reached for the sub-samples. The respective computations 
are available upon request. 
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In order to test for the presence of differences in the duration dependence parameter, 
we consider a Weibull model with change-points. For each criterion, we estimate two 
dependence duration parameters, one for the first duration-period (p1) and another one for the 
second duration-period (p2), and evaluate the statistical significance of the difference between 
the two (p2-p1).
15,16
 The results are reported in Table 5. 
In column 1, we estimate a simple equation without covariates. In column 2, we 
control for differences in the average duration of credit booms between Industrial and 
Developing countries and to account for the possibility of their duration change over time. 
Columns 3 and 4 present the results of separate regressions for Industrial and Developing 
countries, respectively, controlling for time-effects. In column 5, the dummies for the time-
effects are replaced by the dummy for the post-1990 period.
17
 Finally, columns 6 and 7 
present separate regressions for the pre- and post-1990 periods, respectively, controlling for 
group-effects. 
 
<Insert Table 5 around here> 
 
As expected, the results presented in Table 5 show that the duration dependence 
parameter indeed varies with the duration of the credit boom spells. In particular, the 
magnitude of the duration dependence parameter is always significantly lower when credit 
booms are longer than 8 or 10 quarters, considering they are defined by the MT-criteria or 
GVL-criteria, respectively. Remarkably, the difference between the parameters after and 
before the respective change-point (p2-p1) is always negative and statistically significant, 
                                                 
15
 The estimates for the two constant terms are γ1=λ1
p1 and γ2=λ2
p2. 
16
 The delta method is used to compute the respective standard-errors. 
17
 As it very complex to control, at the same time, for change-points and different duration dependence 
parameters for the pre- and post-1990 periods, we use instead the dummy D90_10 and estimate separate 
regressions for both periods to control for those time differences. 
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independently of the criteria used to define credit booms.
18
 In particular, considering the MT-
criteria, increasing positive duration dependence is observed in credit booms that last less than 
8 quarters, while decreasing (or constant) duration dependence characterizes those booms that 
last more than that threshold. Consequently, our findings show that there is significant 
evidence of credit boom episodes ending within two years. With the GVL-criteria, even 
though increasing duration dependence is observed for booms that last less than 10 quarters, 
when their length is longer, duration dependence is no more present, i.e. the likelihood of 
ending is no longer dependent on their age. Indeed, while the parameter p1 is statistically 
significant in all specifications, p2 does not seem to exhibit statistical significance. As a result, 
independently of the criteria used, we robustly find that there is a change-point in the duration 
of credit booms. Moreover, all these results hold even when country/group-effects and time-
effects are controlled for. 
After controlling for change-points, we are still observing that the average duration of 
credit booms is significantly higher in the group of Industrial countries and that its duration 
has increased over the last two decades (see, in particular, columns 2 and 5). As our final 
exercise, we control for the presence of change points in each group of countries (columns 3 
and 4) and time-periods (columns 6 and 7) separately. Independently of the criterion or 
subgroups used, all results show the presence of a change-point, therefore, this confirms our 
simple plotted charts in Figure 1. Overall, the results are similar to the ones obtained with the 
full sample except for developing countries. When the MT-criteria is used for developing 
countries (column 4), we confirm the presence of (increasing) duration dependence for credit 
booms that last less than 8 quarters, however, duration dependence is no longer present for 
those booms that last more than that threshold. 
Thus, our results conclude that there is strong evidence supporting the presence of a 
change-point in the duration of credit booms, independently of the criteria used to define them 
(MT or GVL) and the sub-group of countries (Industrial or Developing) or time period (pre- 
                                                 
18
 Even though Figure 1 is clear about the location of the change-points, we tried other quarters as change-points, 
but unsurprisingly this difference was never statistically significant in those cases. Those additional results are 
not reported here to save space but they are available upon request. 
 30 
or post-1990) considered. Therefore, our findings show strong evidence that the life of credit 
booms dies out within two years regardless of any criteria, sub-group of countries and time 
period used. 
 
5.3. Robustness checks 
The MT-criteria identifies a credit boom when the deviation of the real credit per 
capita from its trend exceeds 1.75 times its standard deviation. The GVL-criteria considers 
that a credit boom takes place if the deviation of the ratio of credit to GDP from its trend 
exceeds 1.5 times its standard deviation or the (year-on-year) growth in the credit-GDP ratio 
exceeds 20 percent. For robustness purposes, we consider different and reasonable values for 
those parameters and check whether our findings are robust to those changes or not. 
Accordingly, for the MT-criteria, we replace the parameter =1.75 by =1.5 and =2.0 and 
for the GVL-criteria, we consider =1.75 and =2.0 instead of =1.5. Table 6 presents the 
results of these robustness checks for both criteria with different parameters. For this analysis, 
we select the more representative equations from the regressions presented above for both the 
basic Weibull model and the Weibull model with change-points. 
 
<Insert Table 6 around here> 
 
Starting with the MT-criteria and considering the basic Weibull specification (columns 
1 and 3 in Table 6), the results support our empirical findings: there is evidence of increasing 
duration dependence using either the 1.5 or 2.0 thresholds. These results also confirm that 
industrial countries are characterized by longer credit booms and that their length has 
increased over the last couple of decades. This evidence is also supported by the Weibull 
specifications with change-points (columns 2 and 4). Most importantly, we corroborate the 
presence of a change-point in credit booms at the same 8 quarters threshold as increasing 
positive duration dependence is found for shorter booms while their duration dependence is 
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constant for longer ones. Consequently, the difference in the duration dependence parameters 
is statistically significant either at ϕ=1.5 or =2.0. 
The results for the GVL-criteria are not different from the ones obtained above: (i) the 
basic Weibull specifications (regressions 5 and 7) confirm the evidence of decreasing duration 
dependence; (ii) there are no significant differences between industrial and developing 
countries; (iii) credit booms became longer over the last decades; (v) the presence of a 
change-point is confirmed (the difference p₂-p₁ is statistically significant either for =1.75 or 
=2.0); (vi) increasing duration dependence is observed for those booms that last less than 10 
quarters although, once again, no duration dependence is found for longer events. As a result, 
our robustness analysis confirms our empirical findings. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper analyses whether the credit booms are duration dependent and investigates 
the presence of change-points in the likelihood of they ending. It represents an avenue of 
research that, to the best of our knowledge, remains vastly unexplored in the empirical 
literature of credit booms. We employ a continuous-time duration model over a group of 71 
countries from 1975q1 to 2010q4 to investigate whether the likelihood of credit booms ending 
indeed depends on its own age and to check the presence of change-points in its behaviour. 
The credit booms considered in this analysis were identified using two criteria well 
established in the literature: the Mendoza-Terrones and the Gourinchas-Valdes-Landarretche 
criteria. 
The main message of this paper is that there is robust evidence of positive duration 
dependence in credit booms. This finding provides information of the predictability of credit 
boom episodes. It implies that the risk of credit booms coming to an end in a particular year 
increases over time. 
Our results also show that these events have become longer over the last decades, 
which means an increase in the persistence of credit boom phases over time. Moreover, the 
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findings provided by this study also indicate that credit booms are, on average, longer in 
Industrial than in Developing countries. 
Additionally, the baseline Weibull duration model was extended to allow for breaks or 
change-points in the duration dependence parameter. While the basic Weibull model assumes 
that the behaviour of duration dependence is smooth (i.e. either constant, increasing or 
decreasing) over time, the degree of likelihood of a credit boom ending as it gets older may 
change after a given duration. The empirical findings indeed support the presence of a 
change-point: increasing positive duration dependence is observed in booms that last less than 
eight to ten quarters, but it becomes decreasing or even non-relevant for longer events 
(according to the GVL-criteria). This evidence is robust to the criteria used to define credit 
booms (MT or GVL criteria) and the sub-group of countries (Industrial or Developing) or 
time period (pre- or post-1990) considered. This represents a striking finding in this field of 
the literature that certainly contributes to a better and deeper understanding of the credit 
booms behaviour. Moreover, it can also contribute to a timely formulation of policies that can 
help fine-tuning the trade-off between credit and economic growth. 
Additionally, we also show that those credit booms that end up in a crisis (bad credit 
booms) also exhibit evidence of positive duration dependence and the presence of a change-
point: the likelihood of bad booms ending increases at an increasing rate for those that last 
less than 10 quarters; for those that last longer the respective likelihood also increases but at a 
decreasing rate. 
While providing valuable information on the duration of credit booms, the present 
paper opens new avenues for further work. For instance, given that the selection of the 
change-point is exogenously determined by a sensible graphical analysis of the survivor 
function, an interesting extension of this piece of research would be to incorporate a discrete 
latent variable in the standard Weibull model. This would make the selection of the change-
point endogenous, thereby, representing a challenging and promising approach to be 
considered in the future. 
Finally, we observed that longer credit booms tend to be less dependent on its age – as 
shown by the Weibull model with change-points. Hence, it is likely that other time-varying 
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factors might be considered to explain its duration. This means that the study of the duration 
of credit booms can also be extended with the application of discrete-time duration models 
that allow for the inclusion of those time-varying covariates. That is another dimension of the 
problem that is beyond of the scope of this paper but to which the authors are carefully 
addressing in another paper. 
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List of Tables 
 
Dur Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max.
MT (2008) criteria
All countries 123 6.05 2.8 2 17
Industrial countries 32 7.44 2.83 4 16
Develping countries 91 5.56 2.63 2 17
D_Indus 123 0.26 0.44 0 1
Event 123 1.52 0.77 1 5
1975-1979 12 4.67 2.31 2 8
1980-1989 30 5.63 2.22 2 10
1990-1999 50 6.46 3.23 2 17
2000-2010 31 6.32 2.61 2 12
GVL (2001) criteria
All countries 231 8.53 5.88 2 35
Industrial countries 51 8.51 5.28 2 27
Develping countries 180 8.54 6.05 2 35
D_Indus 231 0.22 0.42 0 1
Event 231 2.23 1.24 1 7
1975-1979 16 5.69 2.89 2 12
1980-1989 41 5.98 3.05 2 16
1990-1999 76 8.93 5.42 2 27
2000-2010 98 9.77 6.95 2 35
Notes : This table reports the number of episodes (Obs.), the mean duration (Mean), the standard deviation (S.D.), the
minimum (Min.) and the maximum (Max.) duration for credit boom spells. The data are quarterly and comprises 79
countries over the period 1975q1-2010q4. Credit booms are identified using the works of Mendoza and Terrones (2008)
and Gourinchas et al. (2001). The MT-criteria identifies a credit boom when the deviation of the real credit per capita from
its trend exceeds 1.75 times its standard deviation. The GVL-criteria considers that a credit boom takes place if the
deviation of the ratio of credit to GDP from its trend exceeds 1.5 times its standard deviation or the (year-on-year) growth
in the credit-GDP ratio exceeds 20 percent. Note that this criteria was more recently applied and updated by Barajas,
Dell'Ariccia and Levchenko (2009).
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the episodes and duration of credit booms
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Duration dependence in credit booms: basic Weibull model estimation
MT-criteria (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
g 0.0113 *** 0.0137 ** 0.0048 ** 0.0056 0.0118 ** 0.0105 ** 0.0148 ** 0.0027 0.0148 **
[0.0042] [0.0058] [0.0021] [0.0060] [0.0047] [0.0044] [0.0067] [0.0018] [0.0068]
p 2.320 +,i 2.236 +,c 2.903 +,i 4.724 +,i 2.387 +,i 2.431 +,i 2.275 +,c 2.784 +,i 2.275 +,c
[0.189] [0.209] [0.235] [0.390] [0.218] [0.235] [0.245] [0.326] [0.245]
∆p -0.212 ** 0.510
[0.111] [0.403]
p+∆p 2.219 +,c 2.784 +,i
[0.202] [0.321]
θ 0.337 **
[0.147]
D_Indus -0.564 ** -1.701 **
[0.237] [0.805]
LogL -84.78 -288.72 -81.96 -18.15 -80.81 -287.31 -285.42 -15.28 -64.66
LR test 0.022 0.000
SBIC 179.18 587.07 178.36 397.21 176.07 589.05 590.08 37.50 138.35
Spells 123 123 123 123 123 123 123 32 91
GVL-criteria
g 0.0245 *** 0.0338 *** 0.0033 ** 0.0269 ** 0.0241 *** 0.0243 *** 0.0263 *** 0.0177 ** 0.0263 ***
[0.0043] [0.0073] [0.0013] [0.0124] [0.0042] [0.042] [0.0049] [0.0077] [0.0049]
p 1.627 +,d 1.513 +,d 2.931 +,i 2.348 +,i 1.627 +,d 1.621 +,d 1.593 +,d 1.772 +,c 1.593 +,d
[0.080] [0.092] [0.242] [0.130] [0.079] [0.081] [0.087] [0.187] [0.087]
∆p 0.037 0.179
[0.072] [0.203]
p+∆p 1.657 +,d 1.772 +,c
[0.094] [0.184]
θ 1.062 ***
[0.215]
D_Indus 0.056 -0.397
[0.171] [0.469]
LogL -231.73 -667.37 -213.16 -171.29 -231.67 -673.75 -673.47 -47.90 -183.36
LR test 0.000 0.001
SBIC 474.34 1345.62 442.64 777.97 479.67 1353.49 1368.70 103.66 377.10
Spells 231 231 231 231 231 231 231 51 180
Notes: Estimations for the duration of credit booms considering the Mendoza and Terrones (2008) criteria (first block) and Gourinchas et al. (2001) criteria (second block). Heteroscedasticity 
and serial autocorrelation robust standard errors clustered by country are reported in square brackets; ***, **, * - statistically significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively; ⁺ indicates that p is 
significantly higher than one using a one-sided test with a 5% significance level; d, c, and i indicate decreasing, constant and increasing positive duration dependence, respectively; △p  is the 
estimated difference in the duration dependence parameter between Industrial and Developing countries; p +Δp  is the value of the duration dependence parameter for the Industrial countries.
The Schwartz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC) is computed as follows: SBIC= 2(-logL+(k/ 2)logN) , where k  is the number of regressors and N  is the number of observations (spells). 
Truncation at the minimum values of Dur  is used in the regressions presented in column 2.  In column 3, the p-value of the LR test for unobserved heterogeneity/frailty gives assesses if the 
estimated variance (θ ) is different from zero. In column 4, the p-value  of the LR test  analyses the statistical significance of country-specific dummy variables (pooling test), that is, LR=-
2(logL_{r}-logL_{u}) , where r  and u  correspond to the restricted and unrestricted models, respectively. Columns 8 and 9 present separate regression results for the Industrial and Developing 
countries, respectively  
Table 3: Duration dependence in credit booms: basic Weibull with time-effects
MT-criteria (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
g 0.0125 * 0.0171 ** 0.0137 ** 0.0101 *** 0.0097 * 0.0094 * 0.0103 **
[0.0067] [0.0073] [0.0058] [0.0039] [0.0057] [0.0056] [0.0044]
p 2.388 +,i 2.478 +,i 2.450 +,i 2.609 +,i 2.624 +,i 2.624 +,i 2.393 +,i
[0.215] [0.194] [0.204] [0.198] [0.273] [0.274] [0.237]
∆p -0.220 ** -0.241
[0.100] [0.296]
p+∆p 2.389 +,i 2.383 +,i
[0.209] [0.228]
D_Indus -0.576 ** -0.519 ** -0.497 ** -0.489 ** -0.489 ** -0.237 -0.579 **
[0.235] [0.223] [0.234] [0.230] [0.229] [0.304] [0.289]
Event -0.037
[0.179]
Dec80 -0.357
[0.291]
Dec90 -0.774 ***
[0.284]
Dec00 -0.588 **
[0.268]
D90_10 -0.439 ** 0.046
[0.203] [0.611]
LogL -80.78 -77.65 -78.46 -283.72 -283.72 -26.04 -51.94
SBIC 180.81 184.17 176.17 586.69 591.50 63.30 117.07
Spells 123 123 123 123 123 42 81
GVL-criteria
g 0.0269 *** 0.0387 *** 0.0374 ** 0.0177 ** 0.0167 *** 0.0152 *** 0.184 ***
[0.0056] [0.0104] [0.0072] [0.0033] [0.0065] [0.0057] [0.0039]
p 1.627 +,d 1.772 +,d 1.756 +,d 2.117 +,c 2.143 +,c 2.167 +,c 1.666 +,d
[0.080] [0.078] [0.082] [0.111] [0.202] [0.196] [0.088]
∆p -0.442 *** -0.475 **
[0.077] [0.219]
p+∆p 1.675 +,d 1.668 +,d
[0.080] [0.088]
D_Indus 0.023 0.112 0.125 0.135 0.136 0.378 0.071
[0.176] [0.168] [0.164] [0.161] [0.161] [0.265] [0.0173]
Event -0.047
[0.175]
Dec80 -0.092
[0.224]
Dec90 -0.876 ***
[0.267]
Dec00 -1.156 ***
[0.246]
D90_10 -0.962 *** 0.079
[0.139] [0.434]
LogL -231.41 -214.90 -216.55 -656.48 -656.47 -43.36 -170.60
SBIC 484.60 462.46 454.87 1334.74 1340.16 98.85 356.68
Spells 231 231 231 231 231 57 174
Notes : See Table 2. △p is the estimated difference in the duration dependence parameter between the pre- and post-1990 periods; hence, p +Δp is the value
of the duration dependence parameter for the the period post-1990; Columns 6 and 7 present separate regression results for the pre- and post-1990
periods, respectively.  
  
Table 4: Duration dependence in bad credit booms
MT-criteria (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
g1 0.0156 * 0.0154 0.0108 0.0161 0.1409 *** 0.1853 ***
[0.0076] [0.0096] [0.0069] [0.0191] [0.0098] [0.0467]
g2 0.2316 *** 0.3954 ***
[0.0763] [0.1142]
p1 2.086 +,c 2.141 +,c 2.147 +,c 2.272 +,c 2.457 +,c 2.491 +,i
[0.235] [0.313] [0.254] [0.515] [0.280] [0.276]
p2 1.003 1.118
[0.253] [0.340]
∆p -0.028 -0.127
[0.443] [0.567]
p+∆p 2.114 +,c 2.146 +,c
[0.314] [0.270]
p2-p1 -1.454 *** -1.373 ***
[0.398] [0.445]
D_Indus -0.427 -0.464 -0.408 -0.334
[1.031] [0.459] [0.470] [0.407]
Event 0.312
[0.458]
D90_10 -0.134 -0.306
[1.262] [0.370]
LogL -34.15 -108.17 -33.15 -107.68 -106.61 -105.77
SBIC 75.83 231.39 81.34 234.17 224.50 234.10
Spells 43 43 43 43 43 43
GVL-criteria
g1 0.0081 ** 0.0093 ** 0.0091 0.0101 0.1037 *** 0.4141 ***
[0.0033] [0.0047] [0.0060] [0.0123] [0.0072] [0.0971]
g2 0.1068 *** 1.2637 *
[0.0146] [0.6613]
p1 2.022 +,c 1.949 +,c 2.033 +,c 2.039 +,c 2.682 +,i 2.686 +,i
[0.150] [0.181] [0.155] [0.417] [0.344] [0.350]
p2 1.475 +,d 1.505 +,d
[0.223] [0.221]
∆p 0.339 0.014
[0.299] [0.438]
p+∆p 2.288 +,c 2.053 +,c
[0.239] [0.157]
p2-p1 -1.208 *** -1.181 ***
[0.445] [0.450]
D_Indus -0.683 0.147 0.249 0.212
[0.773] [0.374] [0.357] [0.326]
Event -0.154
[0.399]
D90_10 -0.404 -0.287
[1.252] [0.392]
LogL -40.72 -144.15 -40.48 -144.01 -141.99 -141.66
SBIC 89.23 303.86 96.53 307.48 295.66 302.77
Spells 49 49 49 49 49 49
The change point is located at 10 quaters of duration for both criteria.
Notes : See Tables 2 and 3. △p is the estimated difference in the duration dependence parameter between industrial and developing countries (column 2)
and the pre- and post-1990 periods (column 4); hence, p+Δp is the value of the duration dependence parameter for industrial and the post-1990 period,
respectively; p2-p1 is the estimated difference in the duration dependence parameters in the model with a change-point.
 
  
Table 5: Duration dependence in credit booms: basic Weibull with change-points
MT-criteria (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
0.1513 *** 0.2269 *** 0.2118 *** 0.258 *** 0.2340 ** 0.2969 *** 0.7370 ***
[0.0052] [0.0210] [0.0743] [0.0357] [0.0984] [0.0478] [0.1291]
0.181 *** 0.3546 *** 0.4597 * 0.4607 * 0.3800 * 0.3577 ** 3.8444
[0.0183] [0.0412] [0.2431] [0.2567] [0.2080] [0.1439] [4.120]
2.833 +,i 2.890 +,i 4.616 +,i 2.662 +,i 2.888 +,i 2.683 +,i 3.026 +,i
[0.218] [0.219] [0.668] [0.215] [0.219] [0.311] [0.279]
1.457 +,d 1.653 +,c 1.867 +,c 1.479 1.628 +,c 2.206 +,c 1.567 +,c
[0.232] [0.277] [0.387] [0.373] [0.278] [0.436] [0.313]
-1.376 *** -1.237 *** -2.743 *** -1.183 *** -1.259 *** -0.477 -1.459 ***
[0.306] [0.337] [0.795] [0.422] [0.334] [0.547] [0.430]
D_Indus -0.466 ** -0.459 ** -0.245 -0.533 **
[0.189] [0.190] [0.295] [0.229]
Dec80 -0.327 1.024 ** -0.488
[0.314] [0.438] [0.334]
Dec90 -0.618 ** -0.088 -0.598 **
[0.288] [0.302] [0.310]
Dec00 -0.567 * 0.267 -0.683 **
[0.292] [0.384] [0.320]
D90_10 -0.353 *
[0.183]
LogL -283.98 -278.77 -70.66 -203.05 -279.22 -92.08 -186.57
SBIC 582.41 596.03 165.59 437.68 587.32 202.86 395.10
Spells 123 123 32 91 123 42 81
GVL-criteria
0.1167 *** 0.1797 *** 0.1168 *** 0.1695 *** 0.1805 0.2300 *** 0.1704 ***
[0.0034] [0.0197] [0.0216] [0.0105] [0.1751] [0.0368] [0.0094]
0.1436 *** 0.3527 *** 0.2433 0.3151 *** 0.3633 0.5584 0.4747 ***
[0.0135] [0.952] [0.2089] [0.0740] [0.7174] [0.4510] [0.1588]
2.346 +,i 2.426 +,i 2.328 +,c 2.388 +,i 2.429 +,i 2.364 +,i 2.002 +,c
[0.135] [0.140] [0.306] [0.130] [0.141] [0.216] [0.120
1.001 1.128 1.008 1.098 1.112 1.145 0.957
[0.093] [0.102] [0.278] [0.109] [0.102] [0.286] [0.126]
-1.345 *** -1.297 *** -1.320 *** -1.290 *** -1.317 *** -1.219 *** -1.043 ***
[0.170] [0.181] [0.510] [0.167] [0.181] [0.413] [0.126]
D_Indus 0.065 0.069 0.321 0.018
[0.140] [0.139] [0.277] [0.155]
Dec80 -0.079 -0.076 -0.080
[0.277] [0.593] [0.301]
Dec90 -0.801 *** -1.588 *** -0.644 **
[0.296] [0.543] [0.330]
Dec00 -0.976 *** -1.254 *** -0.966 ***
[0.279] [0.541] [0.312]
D90_10 -0.838 ***
[0.146]
LogL -650.35 -637.66 -138.88 -497.31 -638.32 -136.07 -509.91
SBIC 1317.03 1313.43 305.28 1030.98 1309.30 292.36 1040.46
Spells 231 231 51 180 231 57 174
Notes : See Tables 2 and 3. p 2-p 1 is the estimated difference in the duration dependence parameters. Columns 3 and 4 present separate regression results for
the Industrial and Developing countries, respectively. Columns 6 and 7 present separate regression results for the pre- and post-1990 periods, respectively.
The change-point is located at duration equal to 8 quarters in all regressions considering the MT-criteria. For the GVL-criteria, it is located at duration equal
to 10 quarters, except for the Industrial countries and post-1990 period which is located at 15 quarters of duration.
  
  
  
  
     
  
  
  
  
     
 
 
  
 
Table 6: Robustness checks with different thresholds
MT-criteria GVL-criteria
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.0223 *** 0.2641 *** 0.0140 * 0.3763 *** 0.0364 *** 0.1785 *** 0.0358 *** 0.1800 **
[0.0078] [0.0269] [0.0079] [0.0599] [0.0095] [0.0095] [0.0097] [0.0199]
0.3972 *** 0.8366 ** 0.3221 *** 0.3174 ***
[0.0959] [0.3314] [0.0701] [0.0786]
2.330 +,i 2.601 +,i 2.506 +,i 2.968 +,i 1.781 +,d 2.410 +,i 1.767 +,d 2.389 +,i
[0.146] [0.157] [0.237] [0.221] [0.077] [0.146] [0.079] [0.159]
1.683 +,c 1.720 +,c 1.193 1.216
[0.263] [0.317] [0.162] [0.196]
-0.918 *** -1.247 *** -1.217 *** -1.173 ***
[0.313] [0.393] [0.199] [0.212]
D_Indus -0.475 *** -0.434 *** -0.557 ** -0.528 ** 0.040 -0.011 0.085 0.044
[0.181] [0.154] [0.253] [0.212] [0.186] [0.151] [0.198] [0.165]
Dec80 -0.305 -0.274 -0.939 -0.347 -0.033 -0.010 -0.056 -0.039
[0.285] [0.304] [0.349] [0.376] [0.219] [0.268] [0.234] [0.279]
Dec90 -0.592 ** -0.480 * -0.740 ** -0.542 * -0.881 *** -0.795 *** -0.883 *** -0.800 ***
[0.261] [0.264] [0.352] [0.308] [0.273] [0.300] [0.264] [0.288]
Dec00 -0.485 ** -0.464 * -0.471 ** -0.448 * -1.174 *** -1.008 *** -1.145 *** -0.983 ***
[0.246] [0.262] [0.230] [0.255] [0.244] [0.274] [0.248] [0.276]
LogL -109.24 -360.20 -57.48 -211.36 -193.95 -583.03 -179.82 -542.22
SBIC 248.81 755.78 142.09 454.38 419.95 1208.81 391.14 1121.21
Spells 157 157 92 92 209 209 191 191
Notes : See Tables 2, 3 and 4. Odd columns report the results from the basic Weibull model estimation, while even columns show the results from the Weibull model
with a change-point; the change-point is located at duration equal to 8 and 10 quarters for the MT-criteria and GVL-criteria, respectively.
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Figure 1. Survivor functions for credit booms according to criteria, groups and periods. 
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